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ABSTRACT
This Article explores, and ultimately embraces, a new exception to the complete 
diversity rule in removal cases:  the doctrine of procedural misjoinder.  We argue that the 
doctrine offers federal courts a vital tool with which to police joinder gamesmanship.  
Absent this power, plaintiffs may preclude defendant access to federal courts by the 
relatively simple expedient of joining in state court largely unrelated claims against or on 
behalf of non-diverse parties.  The resulting lawsuit thus fails the complete diversity test, 
rendering such cases removal-proof.  Like fraudulent joinder, the long-standing practice
of ignoring non-diverse parties against whom no valid claim may be asserted, the 
doctrine of procedural misjoinder would permit federal courts to disregard any diversity-
destroying parties who have been improperly added to the state lawsuit.  Because access 
to federal courts is at stake, we believe federal courts should adopt this new doctrine, 
applying federal joinder standards to test the legitimacy of plaintiffs’ party alignments 
before denying removal jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
Some very oddly-structured lawsuits have been appearing in state courts lately.  
Plaintiffs who have never met – indeed, who often live half-way across the country from 
one another – are teaming up to sue in state court.  And in many of these cases, the joint 
suits include defendants against whom most of the plaintiffs assert no claim.  
A recent case involving Fen-Phen presents a particularly striking example.  Six 
lawsuits were filed in Georgia state court against New Jersey-based Wyeth Laboratories 
3(the manufacturer of Pondimin and Redux), a Georgia company that made phentermine 
(one of the ingredients of Fen-Phen), and some of Wyeth’s Georgia-based employees.1
Each of these suits included between 15 and 25 joined plaintiffs aligned in an eerily 
similar pattern.  In each case, the group included a single Georgia plaintiff, a single New 
Jersey plaintiff, and a contingent of between 13 and 23 other plaintiffs from states 
scattered across the country.2  The plaintiffs from distant states like Idaho and Wyoming 
had never met their co-plaintiffs from Georgia and New Jersey.  Nor had they any 
grievance against Wyeth’s Georgia-based employees.  
So what were they all doing together in Fulton County, Georgia state court?  How 
can we explain this phenomenon of strangers joining together across state lines, suing 
defendants connected only to a handful of them?  From a distance, such cases appear to 
be random acts of misjoinder – that is, the grouping of claims by or against unrelated 
parties.   But we suspect that in each of these cases, the same thing was driving the 
plaintiffs to commit misjoinder:  the desire to prevent removal jurisdiction.  It is no secret 
that plaintiffs often deliberately structure their state court lawsuits to prevent removal by 
defendants to federal court.  Plaintiffs have long known that they could prevent removal 
in a putative diversity suit by adding a co-plaintiff from the same state as the defendant, 
or by adding a co-defendant from the same state as the plaintiff.3  The trick, of course, 
was finding a “spoiler;” in many cases, the transaction or occurrence being litigated 
simply did not involve a non-diverse plaintiff or defendant to add.
1
 In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 667, 671 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
2
 The additional plaintiffs came from Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, 
Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  See id.
3Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (1806).
4Today, however, some plaintiffs appear to be pushing the limits of (or ignoring 
altogether) the “transactional” structure of modern litigation in order to add a diversity-
destroying party.  They can do this by joining either a non-diverse plaintiff, a non-diverse 
defendant, or both.4  Each of those scenarios present the same problem:  while there is a 
core group of completely diverse parties litigating a particular transaction or occurrence, 
plaintiffs’ joinder of an unrelated party renders diversity incomplete and precludes 
removal.
Defendants have begun fighting back.  Arguing that plaintiffs are abusing the rule 
of permissive joinder in their efforts to thwart diversity removal, defendants contend that 
improperly joined parties simply should not count in the complete diversity calculus.  
Thus, under the so-called doctrine of “procedural misjoinder,”5 federal courts are 
empowered to disregard any misjoined parties when assessing the citizenship of the 
parties for purposes of exercising removal jurisdiction. 6  Advocates of procedural 
misjoinder point to the long-established doctrine of fraudulent joinder for support.  Under 
the fraudulent joinder doctrine, federal courts already do something very similar:  when a 
claim against a non-diverse “spoiler” defendant is wholly without legal merit, the court 
4 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
5
 While some courts have referred to this as “fraudulent misjoinder,” we prefer the 
term “procedural misjoinder” because we do not believe that application of the doctrine 
should rely on an inquiry into a plaintiff’s motive (fraudulent or otherwise).  See infra 
Part IV(C).
6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, 14B FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, §3723 (3rd ed. 1998) (identifying procedural misjoinder as a 
“new concept that appears to be part of the doctrine of fraudulent joinder has begun to 
emerge in the case law”).
5disregards that party for purposes of determining whether there is complete diversity of 
citizenship.7
The doctrine of procedural misjoinder has achieved somewhat mixed success.  On 
one hand, federal courts increasingly have demonstrated willingness to take on this 
challenge, untangling the claims, carving out the improperly joined parties under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 21, and then assessing diversity for each of the newly-separated 
litigation units.  But in other respects, the doctrine of procedural misjoinder has been 
disappointing.  Some courts, following an approach suggested by the Federal Practice and 
Procedure treatise, have refused to adopt the doctrine, instead holding that defendants 
must return to state court and seek severance there.  Still other courts have adopted the 
doctrine but held that any misjoinder must be assessed under state joinder standards 
because the case was initially filed in state court.  In many such cases, courts have found 
joinder proper under the more liberal and forgiving joinder rules employed by the state in 
question.  Finally, some courts have adopted the doctrine but limited it to situations of 
“egregious” misjoinder.
This Article seeks to bring some clarity to this muddled state of affairs, offering a 
proposed methodology for applying the new doctrine.  Parts I and II examine the origins 
of the misjoinder problem, briefly recounting the historical background of the removal 
doctrine and the complete diversity rule, as well as permissive joinder law and misjoinder 
7 See infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text; see also FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE, supra note __, §3641 (discussing fraudulent joinder of nondiverse defendant 
“who could not conceivably be liable” as a procedural device used to defeat complete 
diversity); Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907) 
(“Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent the removal to a Federal 
court where one has that right, and should be equally vigilant to protect the right to 
proceed in the Federal court as to permit the state courts, in proper cases, to retain their 
own jurisdiction.”).
6generally.  Part III explores the emerging case law on procedural misjoinder.  Finally, 
Part IV critiques the existing approaches to this developing area of law and embraces an 
(admittedly) imperfect solution that we believe is nevertheless significantly preferable to 
other more problematic solutions.
We disagree with the courts who reject the doctrine of procedural misjoinder 
altogether.8  While this solution is certainly the easiest to implement, it would entrust 
vital determinations regarding access to federal courts to state legislatures and state 
courts.  We also disagree with the courts that, after adopting the doctrine, have then 
looked to state joinder rules.  This approach suffers from the same weakness as the first 
solution – defendants’ rights to access federal courts becomes dependent upon state 
joinder rules, no matter how disadvantageous or inefficient.  Finally, we reject the use of 
an “egregiousness” requirement.  Indeed, it is the worst of all worlds in that it 
simultaneously complicates the analysis while significantly diluting the power of federal 
judges to protect their removal jurisdiction.
Ultimately, we conclude that federal courts should adopt the doctrine of 
procedural misjoinder and apply federal joinder standards to determine whether parties 
have been improperly joined.  Because we regard misjoinder to be as real a threat to 
diversity removal as fraudulent joinder, we view the doctrine of procedural misjoinder as 
a vital judicial tool to police joinder gamesmanship.  We believe that it is the obligation 
of federal courts to exercise such authority rather than washing their hands of the problem 
by relegating the task to state courts.  A doctrine based on Federal Rule 20 would provide 
8 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
7a uniform, nationwide method for ensuring that the addition of transactionally-unrelated 
parties does not thwart diversity removal.
PART I:  REMOVAL JURISDICTION AND THE COMPLETE DIVERSITY REQUIREMENT
Procedural misjoinder is a removal maneuver.  And removal is a complex blend 
of federal subject matter jurisdiction and statutorily-defined mechanics.  Thus, any 
analysis of procedural misjoinder must begin with a discussion of removal jurisdiction 
and mechanics.  This Part supplies that foundation.  It begins by looking at the removal 
statutes and considering their intersection with original jurisdiction to derive the complete 
diversity requirement for diversity removal.  It then shows how Congress and the courts 
have deviated from this rule over time.  
A. Removal Basics
Under the general removal statute, a state court action may be removed only if it 
was one “of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.”9
Translated, this means that the defendant may remove a case to federal court only if the 
plaintiff could have filed the suit in federal court in the first place.10 It is the removing 
defendant’s burden to show that the federal court would have had subject matter 
jurisdiction had the plaintiff filed in federal court instead of state court.
One of the core bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction is diversity of 
citizenship.  The statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction are well-known.  First, 
there must be complete diversity of citizenship, meaning that no plaintiff can be a citizen 
of the same state as any defendant.  Second, there must be a sufficient amount in 
9
 28 U.S.C. §1441(a).
10
 City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 529 (1997).
8controversy. Recently, the Supreme Court held that federal courts may exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over joined plaintiffs who, on their own, do not meet the 
amount in controversy requirement.11 But the Court made clear that supplemental 
jurisdiction does not extend to joined plaintiffs who would spoil diversity.  In the words 
of the Court, the presence of a single non-diverse plaintiff “contaminates” the suit as a 
whole, destroying the diversity jurisdiction to which the supplemental plaintiff seeks to 
attach himself.  Thus, whether jurisdiction is analyzed under the diversity statute alone or 
in conjunction with the supplemental jurisdiction statute, a federal court can hear the case 
only if the citizenship of all plaintiffs is diverse from that of all defendants.
This is where the doctrine of procedural misjoinder comes in.  It involves a state 
court suit in which the parties are not completely diverse.  As such, it could not be filed 
originally in federal court based on diversity, so therefore can not be removed based on 
diversity.  The defendant argues, however, that the case should be removable based on 
complete diversity insofar as all of the properly joined parties are diverse.  More 
specifically, the defendant argues that the party or parties spoiling complete diversity 
should be disregarded because the claims that involve them do not arise out of or relate to 
the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the suit between the diverse 
parties.  Absent these “misjoined” parties, the complete diversity requirement would be 
satisfied and the case could be removed.
It seems relatively clear that Congress could explicitly allow for removal under 
these circumstances.  First, the requirement of complete diversity comes from Congress, 
11Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Svcs., Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2611 (2005).
9not Article III.12 Congress may authorize “minimal diversity” suits in federal court, and 
did so just this year with class actions.13  Second, there is nothing that forbids Congress 
from vesting more of the Article III diversity power by way of removal than it allows for 
original filing.  If it wanted to, for example, Congress could allow defendants to remove 
regardless of the amount in controversy, even while retaining an amount in controversy 
requirement for plaintiffs.  Summing these principles, there would appear to be no reason 
why Congress – though still preserving the statutory complete diversity requirement as to 
original filings by plaintiffs – could not authorize defendants to remove up to the Article 
III limits of minimal diversity.
Yet it is equally clear that Congress has not explicitly enacted a procedural 
misjoinder mechanism.  Section 1441(a) contains only one explicit exception –
defendants sued under fictitious names do not count.  In other words, a case is removable 
under diversity despite the presence of a same-state defendant if the plaintiff sues the 
defendant as a “Doe” defendant or other fictitious name.  Nothing else in §1441(a) 
permits a court to disregard the citizenship of a state court party when assessing whether 
the suit would satisfy original federal subject matter jurisdiction.
One court has suggested that §1441(b) speaks to the complete diversity 
requirement in that it allows removal only if “only if none of the parties in interest 
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is 
brought.” 14 According to this court, the reference to parties “properly joined” signals 
12State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
13Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
14See Jones v. Nastech Pharmaceutical, 319 F.Supp.2d 720 (S.D. Miss. 2004).
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Congress’s intention that federal courts disregard improperly joined parties for removal 
purposes.15  We do not share this interpretation.  To start, §1441(b) only refers to 
defendants.  But, as we discuss below, it is the presence of misjoined plaintiffs that is the 
most vexing problem.  Moreover, we read §1441(b) as an additional limitation on 
diversity removal, not an expansion.  Section 1441(b) provides that defendants cannot 
remove diversity suits from the courts of their home state.  In multiple defendant suits, 
the bar is triggered if any of the defendants is from that state.  The language in §1441(b) 
regarding “parties in interest properly joined” defines which defendants will trigger the 
home-state removal bar, but it says nothing about which parties count towards the 
“original jurisdiction” requirement in §1441(a).16
In sum, aside from the instruction to disregard “Doe” defendants, the removal 
statutes say nothing to authorize diversity removal for anything less than complete 
diversity.  If procedural misjoinder is to find a home in the existing jurisdictional 
framework, it must look between or beyond the text.
B. Exceptions for Incomplete Diversity -- Then and Now
15 Id. at 725 (asserting that “joinder in that action could only be proper in 
accordance with the state rule of procedure on joinder, not the federal rule of joinder.”).
16While the requirement of complete diversity and the bar on home-state 
defendant removal both operate to prevent removal, they are quite distinct.  Assume, for 
example, a suit filed by a Texas plaintiff against a New York defendant in California state 
court.  If the plaintiff had joined a Texas co-defendant, removal would have been barred 
by §1441(a) for lack of complete diversity, but would not have triggered §1441(b).  In 
contrast, if the plaintiff had joined a California co-defendant, the suit would still have 
satisfied complete diversity and been removable under §1441(a), but would have 
triggered the §1441(b) bar because of the presence of a home state defendant.  
11
One is always tempted to think that the problems of today are new.  In procedure, 
that is often not the case, and so it is with procedural misjoinder.  Indeed, there is a rich 
history to diversity-based removal and jurisdictional spoilers.  For over 80 years – from 
1866 to 1948 –a diverse defendant could remove despite the presence of a spoiler if he 
could show that his portion of the suit was “separable” from the rest of it.  While 
“separable controversy” removal has been abandoned, it gave rise to the doctrine of 
fraudulent joinder.  That doctrine survives, of course, and stands as the clearest current 
response to plaintiffs’ efforts to defeat removal through joinder games.  Finally, this 
section addresses the role of jurisdic tional cures in removed cases, which represents yet 
another way in which federal courts depart from a strict insistence that only complete 
diversity cases can fall within the jurisdiction granted by the removal statute.
1. Separable Controversy and Separate Claim Removal
The First Congress provided for removal in its very first jurisdictional statute, the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.17  The original removal bill allowed out-of-state defendants to 
remove cases brought by home-state plaintiffs when the amount in controversy exceeded 
$500.18  While the statute itself addressed only suits by single plaintiffs against single 
defendants, the courts imported the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. 
17
 Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, § 12.
18
 Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, § 12.
12
Curtiss19 with the result being that diversity-based removal was allowed only when all of 
the plaintiffs were in-state and all of the defendants were out-of-state.20
The original system for diversity-based removal remained in place until after the 
Civil War.  In 1866, however, Congress fundamentally altered diversity-based removal 
with the Separable Controversy Act of 1866,21 which directly addressed the problem of 
jurisdictional spoilers.22  The Act allowed a single diverse defendant to remove his part of 
a case to federal court – despite the presence of joined non-diverse co-defendants – if the 
case against him was separable from the case against the other defendants.23  But the 
Separable Controversy Act of 1866 proved troublesome in that it split the case between 
state court and federal court.  As the Supreme Court remarked, “[m]uch confusion and 
embarrassment, as well as increase in the cost of litigation, had been found to result from 
the provision in the [Act of 1866] permitting the separation of controversies arising in a 
suit, removing some to the Federal court, and leaving others in the State court for 
19
 3 Cranch 267 (1806).
20 See Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 209 (1880).  The opinion in Barney gives 
a splendid overview of the history of removal from the First Congress through 1880.
21
 14 Stat. 306.
22
 The following year, Congress added the Prejudice or Local Influence Act of 
1867, which allowed either an out-of-state plaintiff or defendant to remove upon a 
showing of local bias.  14 Stat. 558.  This removal mechanism, however, continued to be 
subject to the complete diversity rule.  Thus, a non-diverse party joined with a spoiler 
could not invoke “local prejudice” removal, but instead would have to qualify for 
“separable controversy” removal.  See Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 
553 (1873).
23 See Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 210 (1880).
13
determination.”24  To cure the problem, Congress altered diversity-based removal yet 
again, this time providing that the presence of a “separable controversy” allowed the non-
diverse defendant to remove the entire suit.25  Congress evidently continued to believe 
that diverse defendants to a separable controversy should not lose their access to federal 
court simply because a non-diverse co-defendant had been joined.26  But “[r]ather than 
split up such a suit between courts of different jurisdictions, Congress determined that the 
removal of the separable controversy to which the judicial power of the United States 
was, by the Constitution, expressly extended, should operate to transfer the whole suit to 
the Federal court.”27
The “separable controversy” model remained in place until 1948, when Congress 
created the Judicial Code of 1948.  Among its changes, Congress abolished “separable 
controversy” removal and replaced it with a provision allowing removal of the entire suit 
if it included a removable “separate and independent claim or cause of action.”28  This 
marked yet another substantial shift in diversity-based removal.  According to one 
commentator, the courts were still struggling to draw principled lines between separable 
24Id. at 213. 
25
 Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, § 2.
26 Barney, 103 U.S. at 210 (interpreting Congress as intending that the presence of 
a non-diverse co-defendant should not require the diverse defendant “to remain in the 
State court, and surrender his constitutional right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal 
court.”).
27
 Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 213 (1880).
28
 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1958).
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and non-separable claims.29  Under the new model, removal was no longer driven by 
whether the plaintiff sought joint or several liability, but instead would look to whether 
the plaintiff had joined multiple claims.  If the suit contained a separate claim that itself 
was removable, then the whole suit could be removed, leaving it to the district court’s 
discretion whether to remand the tagalong part of the suit.
Diversity-based removal came full circle in 1990, when Congress amended 
1441(c) to limit separate claim removal to federal question cases.30  With that, diversity-
based removal had returned to where it started in 1789:  a diverse defendant joined with a 
diversity spoiler had no statutory vehicle to seek removal on the basis that he had a 
“diversity suit” unfairly (and perhaps intentionally) trapped inside a larger non-removable 
action.
2. Fraudulent Joinder
Perhaps the most important exception to the complete diversity requirement for 
diversity-based removal is the doctrine of fraudulent joinder.  Under the fraudulent 
joinder doctrine, federal courts may disregard a non-diverse party in determining 
complete diversity of citizenship where it can be established that plaintiff does not have a 
29 See William Cohen, Problems in the Removal of a “Separate and Independent 
Claim or Cause of Action”, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1962).
30 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
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valid cause of action against that party.31  The court then decides whether to keep the case 
or remand for lack of diversity based on the remaining parties.32
The fraudulent joinder doctrine does not appear in the current removal statutes, 
but it does have statutory origins.  Recall from above that Congress at one time 
authorized removal of incomplete diversity suits if they contained within them a 
“separable controversy” that met the complete diversity requirement.  Shortly thereafter, 
the Supreme Court ruled that when tortfeasors or obligors were sued jointly there could 
be no separable controversy for removal purposes.33  This was true even if the plaintiff 
could have sued the defendants severally, and defendants could not make the controversy 
separable by mounting separate defenses.34  In short, a plaintiff who pursued his case as 
one for joint liability effectively prevented the diverse defendant from invoking separable 
controversy removal.35
Predictably, defense lawyers started complaining that plaintiffs were conjuring up 
unfounded and improper joint liability claims against nondiverse defendants for the 
31 See Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S. 421, 451 (1823); 1A J. MOORE & B. 
RINGLE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶¶ 0.161[1.-1], at 257-59, 0.161[2], 0.168[3.-2-2], 
at 549 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1989- 1990).
32 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note __.
33 See Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U.S. 41, 43 (1885) (no separable controversy when 
plaintiff sues joint tortfeasors); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 114 U.S. 52, 55 (1885)
(no separable controversy when plaintiff sues joint obligors).
34 See Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Rwy. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 97 (1898).
35
 One treatise authored by a federal judge includes a section frankly titled, “How 
Plaintiff May Prevent Removal by Joining as a Defendant a Resident of the State.”  See
JOHN C. ROSE, ROSE’S FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE, § 385, p. 334 (2nd ed. 
1922).
16
express purpose of precluding separable controversy removal.  These “sham defendants” 
should be disregarded, the defendants argued. 36  The argument was not wholly novel.  By 
then, it was already settled that federal courts should disregard “formal” or “nominal” 
parties when determining whether complete diversity existed.37  These “sham” 
defendants were not really “nominal parties,” however, because the plaintiffs did assert a 
claim of personal liability against them.  It did not take long for both the litigants and 
courts to embrace a new term – “fraudulent joinder” – to describe the alleged unfounded 
assertion of joint liability.38
Finally, in 1907, the Supreme Court explicitly adopted and applied the fraudulent 
joinder doctrine in Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Company,39 finding that 
the defendant had conclusively shown in its removal petition and the supporting materials 
that the nondiverse defendant simply had not done anything that could give rise to joint 
36 See Plymouth Cons. Gold Mining Co. v. Amador & S. Canal Co., 118 U.S. 
264, 270 (1886).
37 See Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S. 421, 451 (1823) (“This Court will not suffer 
its jurisdiction to be ousted by the mere joinder or non-joinder of formal parties.”); see 
also Walden v. Skinner, 101 U.S. 577, 589 (1879) (“[T]he rule is settled that the mere 
fact that one or more [nominal] parties reside in the same State with one of the actual 
parties to the controversy will not defeat the jurisdiction of the court.”); Wood v. Davis, 
59 U.S. 467, 469 (1855) (“It has been repeatedly decided by this court, that formal 
parties, or nominal parties, or parties without interest, united with the real parties to the 
litigation, cannot oust the federal courts of jurisdiction.”).
38
 During a span of fifteen years, the Supreme Court referred to the “fraudulent 
joinder” of a joint tortfeasor no fewer than five times, though each time deciding the case 
on a different basis.  See Ala. Great So. Rwy. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 216-17 
(1906); Kansas City Suburban Belt Rwy. Co. v. Herman, 187 U.S. 63, 70 (1902); 
Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U.S. 635, 638 (1900); Powers v. Chesapeake & O. Rwy. Co., 
169 U.S. 92, 102 (1989); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U.S. 599, 603 (1890).
39
 204 U.S. 176 (1907).
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liability.40  As the Court explained:  “While the plaintiff, in good faith, may proceed in 
the state courts upon a cause of action which he alleges to be joint, it is equally true that 
the Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a removal to a Federal 
court where one has that right, and should be equally vigilant to protect the right to 
proceed in the Federal court as to permit the state courts, in proper cases, to retain their 
own jurisdiction.”41  Concluding that “the real purpose in joining Wettengel was to 
prevent the exercise of the right of removal by the nonresident defendant,” the Supreme 
Court affirmed the lower court’s decision disregarding his presence and refusing 
remand.42
Over the next decade or so, the Supreme Court addressed fraudulent joinder many 
times, clarifying its meaning and making concrete two fundamental principles.  First, the 
Court made clear that there was no fraudulent joinder if the applicable state law 
recognized a possibility of holding the spoiler jointly liable.43  Second, the Court held that 
40
 The plaintiff was injured when he fell into a pot of boiling grease at work.  He 
sued his employer for allowing unsafe working conditions.  He then joined a claim 
against a man named Wettengel, who the plaintiff claimed negligently designed the part 
of the factory where he was injured.  In its removal petition, however, the company 
documented that Wettengel was a rank-and-file draftsman who made no decisions but 
simply followed orders.  It was on this basis that the Supreme Court concluded that 
Wettengel should be disregarded because he did nothing to which any joint duty could 
attach.  Wecker, 204 U.S. at 185.
41 Wecker, 204 U.S. at 185-86.
42 Id.. at 186.
43 See McAllister v. Chesapeake & Ohio Rwy. Co., 243 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1917); 
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Whiteaker, 239 U.S. 421, 424 (1915); Chicago, 
Rock Island & Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184, 193 (1913);  Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy Rwy. Co. v. Willard, 220 U.S. 424, 425 (1911).  In an earlier case 
giving a glimpse into practice under Swift v. Tyson, the Supreme Court had squarely held 
that state law – not federal common law – determined whether joint liability was 
18
the plaintiff’s motive in pursuing joint liability was immaterial.44  So long as the plaintiff 
was pursuing a plausible theory of joint liability, his reasons for doing so simply did not 
matter.  As a result, the Court rejected fraudulent joinder arguments in several cases 
involving spoilers who were legally viable targets but whose real value, being “men of 
small means,” lay in their sharing the same citizenship as the plaintiff.
It bears mentioning that the focus on possible joint liability – rather than just 
possible liability at all – was quite deliberate.  When reading these older fraudulent 
joinder cases, one must recall that common law joinder was far more restrictive (at least 
in actions at law) than the comparatively free-wheeling transaction-based joinder we have 
now under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Under common law pleading, a plaintiff 
could join defendants only if he alleged joint liability (or at least joint and several 
liability).45  “Misjoinder” generally meant that the plaintiff had joined defendants who 
possible.  See Ala. Great So. Rwy. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 219 (1906).  This was 
an important ruling, because federal common law rejected joint liability in many 
situations where state law recognized it.  Nonetheless, the Court was clear that, in 
determining whether a case filed in state law presented a separable controversy, it was 
state law that controlled.  Id.    
44 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Sheehog, 215 U.S. 308, 316 (1909) (“In the case of a 
tort which gives rise to a joint and several liability, the plaintiff has an absolute right to 
elect, and to sue the tort feasors jointly if he sees fit, no matter what his motive.“).  The 
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway continued to press the issue, but the Court held 
firm.  See Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rwy. Co. v. Whiteaker, 239 U.S. 421, 424 
(1915); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Dowell, 229 U.S. 102, 114 (1913); 
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184, 193 (1913).
45 See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 257 
(1928); JAMES GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING 388-391 (6th ed. 
1909); BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 135-38 (2nd ed. 
1895).
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were only separately liable.46  So when the cases delve deeply into whether the non-
diverse defendant could be jointly liable under the applicable state law, they mean just 
that.  If a spoiler – though the target of a valid claim – could only be separately liable, his 
joinder really was improper, and it therefore could be assumed to be a device to deprive 
the defendant of his right to exercise separable controversy removal.47
Oddly enough, the Supreme Court has not applied the fraudulent joinder doctrine 
in the modern joinder era.  The last Supreme Court case finding fraudulent joinder was
46 OLIVER L. BARBOUR, BARBOUR ON THE LAW OF PARTIES 305 (1864); see also
CLARK, supra note __, at 262 (discussing consequences of misjoining severally-liable 
parties); SHIPMAN, supra note ___, at 139-41 (same). 
47
 It is from this vantage point that one must read cases like Chesapeake & Ohio 
Rwy. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146 (1914).  The railroad was being sued by the estate of 
a man struck and killed by one of their trains.  The railroad and the administrator were 
diverse, but the suit also joined claims against the engineer and the fireman on the train, 
both non-diverse to the administrator.  The complaint charged all defendants with 
negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to warn pedestrians of the 
approaching train, and failing to stop the train.  Id. at 150.  In response to the claim that 
the engineer and fireman were fraudulent joined, the Court replied:  “Here the plaintiff’s 
petition, as is expressly conceded, not only stated a good cause of action against the 
resident defendants, but, tested by the laws of Kentucky, as it should be, stated a case of 
joint liability on the part of all the defendants.  As thus stated the case was not removable, 
the joinder of the resident defendants being apparently the exercise of a lawful right.”  Id. 
at 153.  That was the holding, but the court then took on the defendant’s complaint that 
the factual allegations of negligent lookout and failure to warn were demonstrably false, 
explaining that such an argument “went to the merits of the action as an entirety, and not 
to the joinder; that is to say, it indicated that the plaintiff’s case was ill founded as to all 
defendants.  Plainly, this was not such a showing as to engender or compel the conclusion 
that the two employees were wrongfully brought into a controversy which did not 
concern them.”  Id. at 153.  Recently, some courts have cited that language as 
establishing that a defendant cannot invoke fraudulent joinder when the defense that 
precludes liability for the nondiverse party would also preclude liability for the diverse 
party.  See, e.g., Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2004).  The 
so-called “common defense” codicil to fraudulent joinder likely reads Cockrell outside of 
its common law pleading context.  In all likelihood, the Court meant only to note that the 
defense of “it didn’t happen that way and I can prove it” simply does not speak to 
whether the theory pleaded by the plaintiff could lead to joint liability as required for 
proper common law joinder. 
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Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Company, decided in 1921.48  Even then, the Court itself 
did not make a finding of fraudulent joinder, but instead sustained removal based on the 
plaintiff’s failure to contest the defendant’s specific allegations of fraudulent joinder in 
the removal petition.49  Upon that, the Court concluded that “[a]s the joinder was a sham 
and fraudulent – that is, without any reasonable basis in fact and without any purpose to 
prosecute the cause in good faith against the coemploye,”50 it did not matter whether state 
law recognized joint liability or not.  Subsequent Supreme Court cases have 
acknowledged the doctrine of fraudulent joinder and restated its terms but only in dicta.51
Still, there is no doubting the doctrine’s continued vitality. 52  Of course, with the 
end of separable controversy removal in 1948, the focus is no longer on joint liability but 
on the more basic issue of whether the plaintiff states a possible claim against the alleged 
spoiler.  But with that adjustment, fraudulent joinder survives, if not thrives.  Every 
48
 257 U.S. 92 (1921).
49 Id. at 98.
50 Id. at 98.
51
 The 1939 case of Pullman Company v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939) is often 
cited for the doctrine of fraudulent joinder.  In that case, however, the Court specifically 
notes that “there was no charge that the joinder was fraudulent.”  Id. at 541.  The real 
issue in that case was whether the defendant could remove under the separable 
controversy doctrine.  In other words, the case assumed that valid claims against all the 
defendants existed, the question was whether the claim against the non-diverse defendant 
was separable from the balance of the action.  The Court’s most recent reference to 
fraudulent joinder hardly even qualifies as dicta.  See Rurhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 
526 U.S. 574, 581 n.5 (1999) (noting that the Fifth Circuit had rejected the defendant’s 
fraudulent joinder argument).  
52
 As one leading treatise states, “it is well-settled that the district court will not 
allow removal jurisdiction to be defeated by the plaintiff’s destruction of complete 
diversity of citizenship by the collusive or improper joinder of parties.”  FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note __, § 3723, at 625.
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circuit has reaffirmed the doctrine at some point in the last few years.  The burden 
remains high:  the defendant must show that there is no reasonable possibility of a claim 
under applicable state law.  But, when the required showing is made, the federal court 
will disregard the fraudulently joined defendant and assess diversity based on the 
remaining parties.
3. Post-Removal Cures
In order to remove a case based on diversity jurisdiction, there must be complete 
diversity at the time of removal.  This can occur either because the plaintiff’s initial state 
court suit met the complete diversity requirement, 53 or because the plaintiff later created 
complete diversity by voluntarily dismissing the non-diverse parties.54 In the latter case, 
the spoiler must be voluntarily dismissed within one year of when the suit was filed in 
state court.55  But in either situation, complete diversity must exist at the time the 
defendant removes the case.
53 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note __, § 3723, at 571-72.  This, 
apparently, is to prevent a defendant from moving after the suit is filed to create diversity 
in order to remove.  Id. at 574.
54
 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).  Two observations about “new removal” are in order.  
First, while the statute does not explicitly limit “new removal” to voluntary changes, the 
Supreme Court has long held that involuntary changes – such as the court granting 
summary judgment for the non-diverse defendant – do not qualify.  See cite.  Second, as a 
practical matter, the only way a plaintiff can create completely diversity by voluntarily 
changing the party line-up is by deleting the non-diverse parties.  A plaintiff cannot 
create complete diversity by adding parties; if the existing parties have overlapping 
citizenships, the addition of more parties cannot alter that.
55
 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).  This provision was added in 1990 under the view that, 
after one year, it just wasn’t worth the disruption and inefficiency to allow diversity 
removal.  One side effect of capping diversity removal at one year – and perhaps one that 
should have been better anticipated – is that a plaintiff can block removal by joining a 
spoiler for one year and then dismiss the spoiler on day 366 without triggering a new 
removal period.  See Steven S. Gensler, Diversity Class Actions, Common Relief, and the 
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During the last few decades, however, the Supreme Court has recognized (or, 
perhaps, rehabilitated) a limited theory of jurisdictional cure.  Under this theory, 
incomplete diversity can be “cured” by the deletion of the spoiler later in the lawsuit.56
While originally developed in cases filed initially in federal court, it also applies in 
removed cases when a court learns later in the suit that complete diversity did not exist at 
the time of removal.57  Thus, “a district court’s error in failing to remand a case 
improperly removed [for lack of complete diversity] is not fatal to the ensuing 
adjudication if federal jurisdictional requirements are met at the time judgment is 
entered.”58
The next section of this Article addresses joinder and severance under Rule 20 
and Rule 21 respectively, and we reserve our extended discussion of jurisdictional cures 
until then.  But one further point should be made now regarding jurisdictional cures and 
removal jurisdiction.  In extending the jurisdictional cure doctrine to removal, the 
Caterpillar Court made clear that it saw the problem as presenting two separate 
questions.  First, it viewed the core jurisdictional cure question as going to the court’s 
Rule of Individual Valuation, 82 OREGON L. REV. 295, 259-363 (2003) (discussing how 
plaintiffs game removal by underpleading their state court claims during the one-year 
removal period).  The United States Judicial Conference has recently approved and 
forwarded to Congress a recommendation that the one-year cap on diversity removal give 
way for good cause. 
56 See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 572-73 (2004); 
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 836 (1989).
57 See Caterpillar v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1996).
58 Id at 65.
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original diversity jurisdiction under §1332.59  Second, it noted that, even when §1332 is 
satisfied by an eventual cure, there still remained the question of what to do about the 
violation of §1441(a)’s requirement that the court’s subject matter jurisdiction be met at 
the time of removal.60 On this point, the Court was clear:  the technical statutory 
violation of §1441 does not require remand if the jurisdictional defect is later cured.61
“To wipe out the adjudication postjudgment, and return to state court a case now 
satisfying all federal jurisdictional requirements, would impose an exorbitant cost on our 
dual court system, a cost incompatible with the fair and unprotracted administration of 
justice.”  So understood, Caterpillar stands as yet another example of the Supreme Court 
looking beyond the plain text of the removal statutes to uphold removal of a case that, 
initially, does not have complete diversity of citizenship.
59 Id. at 73.
60 Id.
61Id. at 75-77; see also Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 
574 (2004) (stating that the holding of Caterpillar was that the statutory defect under 
§1441(a) did not require remand when the lack of complete diversity was cured later). 
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PART II:  JOINDER AND SEVERANCE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
While procedural misjoinder is, at its core, a removal maneuver, it is a maneuver 
that pivots on party joinder.  This Part, accordingly, looks at party joinder under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  It first considers permissive party joinder and 
misjoinder under Rules 20 and Rule 21 respectively.  It concludes with a deeper look at 
how courts use severance under Rule 21 to cure diversity defects by omitting 
jurisdictional spoilers after – and, sometimes, long after – the federal court assumes 
jurisdiction.  
A. Permissive Joinder and Misjoinder
Historically, in actions at common law, defects in party joinder could be fatal to 
plaintiffs’ claims.62  Equity practice was much more forgiving, ordinarily allowing 
misjoinder of parties to be corrected by a plaintiff through an amendment to the 
complaint.63  The merger of law and equity resulted in a uniform set of procedural rules 
that sided with equity practice, resulting in current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.
Rule 21 states that “misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an 
action.”64   Rather, the rule provides district (and appellate)65 courts the discretion to drop 
or add parties “at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.  Any claim against 
a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.”66  Rule 21 is thus the party 
62 See FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note __, §1681, p.472-73.
63 Id.
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
65 See Newman- Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989).
66 FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
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equivalent of Rule 42(b), which grants federal courts broad discretion to separate claims 
and issues for litigation “in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when 
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy.”67  With respect to 
severance and addition of parties, “Rule 21 furthers the policy of the federal rules to 
continue and determine an action on its merits whenever that can be done without 
prejudice to the parties.”68
Misjoinder of claims, of course, begs the question of when claims are considered 
improper or “misjoined” for Rule 21 purposes.  Misjoinder may be determined by 
improper application of any of the joinder rules, but the rule most relevant to the 
procedural misjoinder line of cases is Rule 20(a), which governs permissive joinder of 
parties.
67 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(B).
68 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note __, at 474.
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Federal Rule 20 is the basic rule defining party-initiated joinder.  It provides, in 
pertinent part:
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to 
relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of 
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences 
and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in 
the action.  All persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if 
there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any 
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of 
law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.69
Thus, Federal Rule 20 provides for both the joinder of multiple plaintiffs and the 
joinder of multiple defendants.  The standard for plaintiff joinder and defendant joinder is 
the same: (1) the joined claims must arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) there must be a question of law or fact 
common to all of the joined claims.  In both cases, party joinder is permissive rather than 
mandatory. 70
  A plaintiff must meet the two-part test to join parties under Rule 20, but it 
remains the plaintiff’s option whether to do so.  Under the modern rules framework, 
joinder of parties is “strongly encouraged” in order to achieve the broadest possible scope 
of action consistent with fairness to the parties.”71
69 FED. R. CIV. P.  20(a).
70See e.g., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note __, §1652, at 397 (Rule 
21 “permits the joinder of persons whose presence is procedurally convenient but is not 
regarded as essential to the court’s complete disposition of any particular claim.”).
71 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); see also
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note __, §1652, at 395 (“The purpose of the 
rule is to promote trial convenience and expedite the final determination of disputes, 
thereby preventing multiple lawsuits.”); Mary Kay Kane, Original Sin and the 
Transaction in Federal Civil Procedure, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1723, 1728-29 (1998) (“Modern 
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There is no definitive standard for what constitutes a transaction under Rule 20.72
Most courts seem to define the transaction as a set of logically-related events.73  But 
rather than establish any hard and fast rules, courts have preferred to analyze 
transactional relatedness on a case-by- case basis informed by policy considerations like 
efficiency, convenience, and fairness.74  The result is a highly-flexible standard that 
eludes fixed boundaries, with courts reaching quite conflicting results as to its meaning.75
This has been particularly true, for example, with respect to product liability cases as 
courts confront attempts to utilize Rule 20 to join the claims of numerous plaintiffs 
joinder policy is to encourage resolving controversies in one lawsuit rather than many, 
and that policy underlies the determination of what may constitute a transaction for 
purposes of [Federal Rule 20]”).
72 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note __, § 20.05[1] (2004).  The reference 
to “occurrences” in Rule 20 appears to be historical, and courts have viewed 
“transaction” and “occurrence” to be synonymous.  Id.; see also FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE, supra note __, §1653, at 412.
73See Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000); Disparte 
v. Corporate Executive Bd., 223 F.R.D. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2004); see generally MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note __, § 20.05[2]; FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra 
note __, § 1653, at 409.
74
  Thirty years ago, the Eighth Circuit described transactional relatedness in 
terms still often quoted today: “’Transaction’ is a word of flexible meaning.  It may 
comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the 
immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship.” Mosley v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974); see also Insolia v. Phillip Morris, 
Inc., 186 F.R.D. 547, 549 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
75 See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1487 (2004) (lamenting that “although the policies underlying Rule 
20 favor joinder whenever possible to serve goals of expediency, efficiency, and 
convenience, the courts themselves have taken mixed and, in some cases, contradictory 
approaches to Rule 20”).
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injured in similar circumstances by a defendant’s product or drug.76  The struggle to 
consistently apply the same transaction requirement is also evident in employment 
discrimination cases.77
B. Rule 21 and Incomplete Diversity:  Recent Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence
It is frequently said that the Federal Rules generally leave party structure to the 
litigants.  It is also said that, for purposes of federal subject matter jurisdiction, the federal 
court takes the case as it finds it.  Together, these suggest a strictly passive model in 
which federal judges assess jurisdiction based on the party line-up as set by the litigants 
76
 In one line of cases, courts have rejected such attempts, requiring “at a 
minimum that the central facts of each plaintiff’s claim arise on a somewhat 
individualized basis out of the same set of circumstances.”  In re Orthopedic Bone Screw 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 1995 WL 428683 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  These courts have denied Rule 20 
joinder where the alleged same transaction consisted of plaintiffs suffering injuries from a 
medical device in different states at different times, id., or being exposed to asbestos or 
tobacco products at different times in different circumstances.  See, e.g., Malcom v. Nat. 
Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1993) (asbestos); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 186 
F.R.D. 547, 549 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (tobacco); see also Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 
1031 (4th Cir. 1983) (rejecting joinder where plaintiffs warranty claims based on different 
cars purchased at different times).
Faced with similarly disparate individual circumstances, however, other courts 
have permitted plaintiffs to sue defendant manufacturers on product liability claims, 
finding that the same transaction standard could be met simply by a defendant’s failure to 
warn or to produce a defective product.  See, e.g., In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 579 (E.D. Tex. 1996); see also Cabraser, supra note __, at 1487-
90 (describing split among courts considering product liability claims).
77 Compare Bailey v. Northern Trust Co., 2000 WL 1567862, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
2000) (denying Rule 20 joinder of employment discrimination claims due to “factual 
differences” among claimants) and Smith v. North Am. Rockwell Corp. Tulsa Div., 50 
F.R.D. 515, 522 (N.D. Okla. 1970) (same) with Streeter v. Joint Indus. Bd. Of the Elec. 
Indus., 767 F. Supp. 520, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that plaintiffs’ hostile work 
environment claims amounted to a single transaction); and Best v. Orner & Wasserman, 
1993 WL 284145 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding same transaction test met even when 
plaintiffs’ claims arose out of separate time periods).
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and do not interfere with those choices in order to affect the jurisdictional consequences.  
Overall, this is no doubt an accurate picture.  But the line between the party control over 
the line-up and passive judicial assessment of jurisdiction is not as bright as we are led to 
believe.
In Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
proper use of Rule 21 to drop from the action a party whose presence destroyed complete 
diversity.78   In Newman-Green, an Illinois corporation brought a breach of contract claim 
against a Venezuelan corporation, four Venezuelan citizens, and an American citizen 
domiciled in Venezuela.  On appeal to the Seventh Circuit of a partial summary 
judgment, the appellate court found that the American defendant destroyed diversity, as 
he was neither a foreign citizen nor a citizen of any state as required by 28 U.S.C. 
§1332(a)(2)-(3).79  Rather than dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
however, the Seventh Circuit panel relied, inter alia, on Rule 21 as authority to grant 
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the nondiverse American defendant from the suit, thereby 
ensuring complete diversity.80  The en banc Seventh Circuit reversed the panel’s decision, 
holding that only district courts have the authority to drop a dispensable nondiverse party, 
and that Rule 21 does not extend that power to appellate courts.
78
 490 U.S. 826 (1989).
79
 Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 832 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1987).
80 Id. at 420.
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The Supreme Court sided with the original Seventh Circuit panel and several 
other circuit courts of appeal,81 finding that appellate courts do indeed “have the power to 
dismiss jurisdictional spoilers” thereby preserving diversity jurisdiction.82   While federal 
subject matter jurisdiction “ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the 
complaint is filed,” the Court noted that “[l]ike most general principles, . . . this one is 
susceptible to exceptions.”83  In this case, the Court found that Rule 21 grants courts 
“authority to allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time, even after 
judgment has been rendered.”84  The Court did, however, caution that appellate courts 
should use this authority “sparingly,” with an eye toward preventing undue prejudice to 
existing parties in the suit.85
81 See, e.g., May Department Store Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 
2002); Soberay Mach. & Equip. CO. v. MRF Ltd., Inc., 181 F.3d 759 (6th Cir. 1999); 
Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1998); Lenon v. St. Paul Mercury 
Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 1365 (10th Cir. 1998); Safeco Ins. Co. v. City of White House, Tenn., 
36 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1994); Turtur v. Rothschild Registry Int’l, Inc., 26 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 
1994); Bhatla v. U.S. Capital Corp., 990 F.2d 780 (3rd Cir. 1993).
82
 490 U.S. at 830.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 832.  See also FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note __, §1685 
(“Courts frequently employ Rule 21 to preserve diversity jurisdiction over a case by 
dropping a nondiverse party if the party’s presence in the action is not required under 
Rule 19. . . . .The courts have also used Rule 21 to drop a party who was joined in an 
action for the purpose of preventing removal to a federal court.”); see also id. §1684 
(“When misjoinder involves the joining of a party who would be proper but whose 
presence destroys diversity,” a court may “avoid dismissing the action by eliminating the 
party whose presence causes the jurisdictional defect, if this can be done without running 
into difficulty under the compulsory-joinder provisions of Rule 19.”).
85 Id. at 837-38.
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In Newman-Green, the presence of a nondiverse party came to light only after the 
case had been litigated through partial summary judgment and was on appeal.  In a more 
recent case, Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, the Court addressed the situation where a district 
court erroneously rejected plaintiff’s timely objection to an improperly removed case.86
In Caterpillar, a Kentucky plaintiff brought a product liability action against a diverse 
bulldozer manufacturer and a nondiverse defendant that serviced the bulldozer.  An 
insurance company intervened as a plaintiff in the suit, bringing subrogation claims 
against both the manufacturer and the service company.  Although the plaintiff settled his 
claim against the nondiverse service company, the insurance company’s claim against it 
remained in the case when the manufacturer removed the case to federal court.  The 
plaintiff objected to removal on the grounds of incomplete diversity – the insurance 
company’s claim against the nondiverse service company destroyed complete diversity.  
The district court rejected this argument, denying plaintiff’s motion to remand.  Later, the 
insurance company also settled its claim against the service company, leaving only 
diverse parties in the case for the trial and entry of judgment.
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the 
district court’s erroneous exercise of subject matter jurisdiction at the time of the 
removal, but held that the post-removal settlement of the claim against the service 
company prior to trial cured that jurisdictional error.87   Justice Ginsburg emphasized that 
86
 519 U.S. 61 (1996).
87 Id. at 477.  This holding follows in part from earlier cases in which removing 
defendants challenged removal jurisdiction after adverse judgments, when at the time of 
trial the parties were completely diverse.  See Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 
U.S. 699 (1972); American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
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“Once a diversity case has been tried in federal court, with rules of decision supplied by 
state law under the regime of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), considerations 
of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming.”88
Rule 21, then, is a powerful tool for courts to exercise in determining appropriate 
(and binding) federal litigation units.  As a practical matter, this procedural power is 
rarely exercised by a federal court in cases involving original jurisdiction because the 
party seeking federal court jurisdiction -- the plaintiff -- will likely structure the litigation 
in a manner to ensure federal court jurisdiction.  Moreover, most diversity defects are 
discovered early in the suit rather than later.  At the beginning of the suit, the court will 
have sunk less time and effort in the suit, and therefore will be less inclined to cure the 
defect rather than simply dismiss the suit and leave it to the plaintiff whether to re-file a 
restructured suit in federal court or to pursue the same suit in a state forum.
The greater untapped potential within Rule 21, then, most likely lies in removed 
actions.  Specifically, the need to examine and curtail improper party joinder arises more 
and more often in the context of removal cases, engendering a perceived need for more 
aggressive use of the Rule 21 authority.  It remains to be seen what role the significant 
discretionary authority federal courts have under Rule 21 to sever and structure federal 
cases might play in the emerging doctrine of procedural misjoinder.
88 Id. at 75 (citing Newman-Green, 490 U.S. 826 (1989).  But cf. Grupo Dataflux 
v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 124 S.Ct. 1920 (2004) (holding that postfiling change in 
plaintiff’s citizenship could not cure defect in diversity jurisdiction, which is to be 
determined at the time of filing).
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PART III:  THE NEW GAME IN TOWN:  PROCEDURAL MISJOINDER
In a recent flurry of cases, several district courts have embraced procedural 
misjoinder as an extension of the long-standing doctrine of fraudulent joinder.  As in 
fraudulent joinder cases, 89 a finding on removal that the plaintiff has improperly 
misjoined parties, either plaintiffs or defendants, in order to frustrate complete diversity, 
empowers a district court on removal to ignore the presence of any nondiverse parties in 
determining diversity of citizenship.  If the court determines that removal of the properly 
joined diverse parties is appropriate, the claims of misjoined parties will be remanded to 
the state court.
Several questions surround this emerging doctrine:  Should it be recognized at all, 
either as a legitimate extension of the fraudulent joinder doctrine or as an independent 
ground for removal jurisdiction?  Is misjoinder defined by state joinder standards 
(because the case was initially filed in state court) or by federal joinder standards 
(because a federal judge will be making the decision)?  Should courts require some 
degree of bad faith beyond mere misjoinder?   This Part explores the doctrine and the 
thorny issues it has raised.  
A. Origins of Doctrine
Procedural misjoinder seems to have originated with the Eleventh Circuit’s 
opinion in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corporation.90  In Tapscott, plaintiffs joined a 
putative class action alleging, inter alia, violations of Alabama common law and statutory 
89 See supra  notes ___-___ and accompanying text.
90 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds, Cohen v. Office 
Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000); see also FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 
supra note __, §3723 (attributing procedural misjoinder doctrine to Tapscott decision).
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fraud in connection with the sale of service contracts related to the sale of automobiles 
(the automobile class) with a class action arising from the sale of service contracts in 
connection with retail products (the merchant class).91  The named class representative 
for the automobile class, Gregory Tapscott, was an Alabama citizen.  He joined sixteen 
additional named plaintiffs and over twenty defendants, one of whom was an Alabama 
resident.  With respect to the merchant class, a separate group of plaintiffs, including two 
Alabama plaintiffs, asserted claims against several nondiverse defendants and Lowe’s 
Home Centers, Inc., a diverse North Carolina citizen.  Lowe’s removed the case to 
federal court, seeking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332, and filed a motion to 
sever the claims against it from the claims against the other defendants.  The district court 
granted the motion to sever pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, finding “an 
improper and fraudulent joinder, bordering on a sham.”92  Plaintiffs had failed to assert 
any joint liability or conspiracy between Lowe’s and the nondiverse defendants, and 
determined that the alleged transactions in the automobile class had no commonality with 
the transactions alleged in the merchant class except for the fact that both classes alleged 
violations of the same Alabama Code provisions.  The court then asserted jurisdiction 
over the plaintiff claims against Lowe’s, and remanded the claims against the remaining 
defendants to state court.93
91
 77 F.3d at 1355.
92
 Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., No. CV 94-PT-2027-S, at 2 (N.D. Ala. 
Nov. 1, 1994) (memorandum opinion).
93 Id. at 1355-56.
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Affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ argument that 
misjoinder may never rise to the level of fraudulent joinder.94  In other words, so long as 
plaintiffs state a valid claim against a defendant, joinder of that claim with a 
transactionally unrelated (and therefore, pursuant to Rule 20, misjoined) claim cannot be 
regarded as fraudulent joinder.  The Eleventh Circuit held that “Misjoinder may be just as 
fraudulent as the joinder of a resident defendant against whom a plaintiff has no 
possibility of a cause of action.”95  The court cautioned, however, that not all misjoinders 
by plaintiffs will rise to such an “egregious” level it may be regarded as fraudulent 
joinder.96  Unfortunately, the court did not provide additional guidance regarding how to 
distinguish between ordinary misjoinder and “egregious” misjoinder that would permit a 
court to disregard the citizenship of nondiverse misjoined defendants in considering 
removal from state courts of otherwise completely diverse parties.97
The Fifth Circuit, in In re Benjamin Moore & Company, signaled its amenability 
to the fraudulent misjoinder theory.98  In Benjamin Moore, the court rejected defendants’ 
request for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to consider the possibility of 
94 Id. at 1360.
95 Id. (quoting Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921) (“A 
defendant’s ‘right of removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a resident 
defendant having no connection with the controversy.’”).
96
 77 F.3d at 1360.
97 See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 722, 728 (S.D. Ind. 
2003) (noting that although Tapscott  required “something more” than mere misjoinder, 
“[p]recisely what the ‘something more’ is was not clearly established in Tapscott and has 
not been established since.”).
98
 309 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2002).
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fraudulent misjoinder, but did so in an opinion that favorably cited Tapscott’s language 
regarding fraudulent misjoinder and suggested the application of the theory to the joinder 
of multiple plaintiffs “who have nothing in common with each other.”99 The Fifth Circuit 
panel expressed “confiden[ce] that the able district court did not intend to overlook a 
feature critical to jurisdictional analysis,” consideration of whether “misjoinder of 
plaintiffs should . . . be allowed to defeat diversity jurisdiction.”100
In a second denial of mandamus relief in the Benjamin Moore litigation, the Fifth 
Circuit found that it did not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s subsequent 
rejection of defendants’ fraudulent misjoinder objection.101  The court once again, 
however, indicated apparent support for the theory:  “Thus, without detracting from the 
force of the Tapscott principle that fraudulent misjoinder of plaintiffs is no more 
permissible than fraudulent misjoinder of defendants to circumvent diversity jurisdiction, 
we do not reach its application in this case.”102
B. Development and Opposition to Procedural Misjoinder
In the last several years, as one district court noted, the procedural misjoinder 
doctrine “has not met with resounding approval.”103  Yet district courts in a number of 
99 Id. at 298 (citing Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1360).
100 Id.
101
 In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626  (5th Cir. 2002).
102 Id. at 630-31.
103
 Jamison v. Purdue Pharma Co., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1319 (S.D. Miss. 2003); 
see also infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions have followed Tapscott’s lead,104 and some have expanded it even further to 
eliminate the requirement of “egregious” misjoinder.105  The doctrine has proved most 
attractive to courts grappling with complex product liability suits, where plaintiffs 
routinely join nondiverse physicians or retailers as defendants to defeat diversity 
jurisdiction, or join the claims of plaintiffs from multiple states with nothing in common 
except a common (or similarly situated) defendant.106
Expanding on Tapscott, district courts have applied its procedural misjoinder 
doctrine to the improper joinder of plaintiffs.  For example, in Greene v. Wyeth,  the 
district court determined that while the claims all of the Nevada plaintiffs against the non-
Nevada (and therefore diverse) manufacturers of the diet drug combination Fen-Phen 
shared a sufficient transactional nexus, only two of the plaintiffs asserted claims against 
an in-state physician and a sales representative.107  The remedy for this misjoinder was to 
utilize Rule 21 to sever and remand the suits brought by the two plaintiffs who asserted 
104 See, e.g., Greene v. Wyeth, 344 F. Supp. 2d 674 (D. Nev. 2004); Jones v. 
Nastech Pharmaceutical, 319 F. Supp. 2d 720 (S.D. Miss. 2004); Grennell v. Western So. 
Life Ins. Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D. W.Va. 2004); Burns v. Western So.n Life Ins. 
Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D. W.Va. 2004); In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 294 F. 
Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Coleman v. Conseco, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. 
Miss. 2002); In re Rezulin Prod. Liab. Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
105 See Burns, 298 F. Supp. 2d 401; Greene, 344  F. Supp. 2d 674, 684 (“The rule 
regarding severance where there is a ‘fraudulent misjoinder’ is new and not universally 
applied”); infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
106 See generally John B. Oakley, Joinder and Jurisdiction in the Federal District 
Courts:  The State of the Union of Rules and Statutes, 69 TENN. L. REV. 35 (2001) 
(noting that the “liberal joinder rules, combined with the high cost of litigation and strict 
rules of claim preclusion, have made the typical modern federal civil action a multi-
claim, multi-party action which often involves exquisitely complex clusters of claims and 
massively sprawling sets of parties.”).
107
 344 F. Supp. 2d 674, 683 (D. Nev. 2004).
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claims against the non-diverse defendants, retaining diversity jurisdiction over the other 
plaintiffs’ claims.108
Similarly, in Jones v. Nastech Pharmaceutical, the court found in the case of 
multiple plaintiffs that the joinder of one Mississippi plaintiff with claims against both 
the diverse defendant pharmaceutical companies and a nondiverse Mississippi physician 
defendant amounted to procedural misjoinder.109  The court ordered the remand of the 
single plaintiff’s claims and retention of the remaining claims by plaintiffs not treated by 
the physician and completely diverse from the pharmaceutical defendants.110
The court in In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, noted that pharmaceutical 
cases raise “more complicated issues of causation and exposure” than “pure product 
defect” cases where “an identical product defect allegedly caused identical results.”111
Rather, the court explained, the Rezulin litigation plaintiffs
allege a defect (or defects) the precise contours of which are unknown and 
which may have caused different results – not merely different injuries –
in patients depending on such variables as exposure to the drug, the 
patient’s physical state at the time of taking the drug, and a host of other 
known and unknown factors that must be considered at trial with respect 
to each individual plaintiff.  . . .   Joinder ‘of several plaintiffs who have 
no connection to each other in no way promotes trial convenience or 
expedites the adjudication of asserted claims.’112
108 Id.
109
 319 F. Supp. 2d 720, 727 (S.D. Miss. 2004).
110 Id.
111 168 F. Supp. 2d 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
112 Id. at 146. (quoting In re Diet Drugs, 1999 WL 554584, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1999)); 
see also Simmons v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 1996 WL 617492, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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In similar circumstances, however, some courts have declined to apply the 
doctrine of procedural misjoinder.  In a case involving the prescription drug Oxycontin, 
for example, five Mississippi plaintiffs filed suit against diverse manufacturers and 
marketers of the drug, as well as nondiverse pharmacies and a Mississippi physician.113
Defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing fraudulent misjoinder.  The court 
declined to apply the theory, finding that while only two of the plaintiffs asserted medical 
malpractice claims against the physician, not every plaintiff need bring a claim against 
every defendant.  The claims were logically related under Mississippi joinder law,114 the 
court held, and the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged a conspiracy between the defendants 
(unlike the two classes in Tapscott who had no defendants in common and did not assert 
any claims of conspiracy).115
Courts have also applied the doctrine of procedural misjoinder in cases where 
plaintiffs in one state join a plaintiff from the defendant’s home state for the purpose of 
defeating removal.  The problem with such joinder, according to one court, is that the 
nondiverse out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims “’occurred in complete factual, temporal and 
geographic isolation’ from the claims of the [in-state plaintiffs].  Plaintiffs presented no 
evidence to the Court that their transactions were related in any way.”116
113 Id.
114 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
115 Id. at 1322-23; see also Sweeney v. Sherwin Williams Co., 304 F. Supp. 2d 
868, 873-74 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (rejecting removal based on procedural misjoinder in 
products liability action against manufacturers of lead-based paint, where nondiverse 
retailers sold paint to at least one plaintiff).
116
 238 F. Supp. 2d 804, 818 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (quoting Rudder  v. Kmart, 1997 
WL 907916 (D. Ala. 1997).; see also In re Diet Drugs, 294 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Pa. 
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Despite this apparent trend toward acceptance of the procedural misjoinder 
doctrine, the authors of Federal Practice and Procedure, the leading civil procedure 
treatise, have been far less enthusiastic.  Voicing concerns about the development of 
procedural misjoinder, and the creative use of Rule 21 to exclude nondiverse parties from 
the diversity jurisdiction decision in removal cases, the treatise authors suggest that the 
better solution to such misjoinder may be to require 
the removing party challenge the misjoinder in state court before seeking 
removal.  Because removal is not possible until the misjoined party that 
destroys diversity jurisdiction is dropped from the action, the thirty-day 
time limit for removal (but not the overall one-year limit for diversity 
cases) would not begin to run until that had occurred and thus a 
requirement that misjoinder be addressed in the state court would not 
impair the ability of an individual to remove an action following the 
elimination of the improperly joined party.”117
Concurring with this approach, one court emphasized that “the last thing the federal 
courts need is more procedural complexity,” including uncertainty regarding when 
misjoinder rises to the level of “egregiousness” justifying the disregard of nondiverse 
parties for removal purposes.118
2003) (finding fraudulent misjoinder of New Jersey diet drug consumers with claims of 
Georgia plaintiffs as the defendant pharmaceutical company was a citizen of New 
Jersey).
117 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note __, §3723; see also id. §3641 
(“Another technique used by some district courts is to remand the case and require the 
diverse defendant to resolve the claimed misjoinder in state court.  If the state court later 
severs the case so diversity exists, the defendant could again seek removal.”).
118
 Osborn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 
2004); see also Hewitt v. AAA Ins. Co., 1999 WL 243642, *2 (E.D. La. 1999); infra
notes __-__ and accompanying text.
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Indeed, courts have applied inconsistent standards to the question of 
egregiousness.119  Guided by Tapscott’s language, the majority of courts demand more 
than simply the presence of nondiverse misjoiner parties, but rather a showing that the  
misjoinder reflects an egregious or bad faith intent on the part of the plaintiffs to thwart 
removal.120  More recently, however, some courts have begun to reject such an  
egregiousness requirement, holding that misjoinder alone justifies the severance of 
nondiverse parties in removal cases involving otherwise diverse citizens.121
PART IV:  PROCEDURAL MISJOINDER:  A FEDERAL DOCTRINE
TO PROTECT FEDERAL INTERESTS
As developed above, the federal courts have taken different paths.  One approach 
is to reject the doctrine altogether as an unwarranted or imprudent exercise of discretion 
on the part of federal district courts.  Under this approach, the case is remanded and the 
defendant must argue misjoinder and seek severance in state court. Most of the courts to 
have addressed the issue, however, have adopted the doctrine of procedural misjoinder 
and, accordingly, will consider whether parties have been misjoined in a way that is 
blocking removal.  Within this group, most of the courts have concluded that state joinder 
rules control, though a few still look to Federal Rule 20.  Finally, whether the court 
chooses to apply state or federal joinder standards, the court must decide whether it will 
sustain removal upon any showing of misjoinder or whether the court will remand absent 
a showing of egregious misjoinder. 
119 See, e.g., Greene, 344  F. Supp. 2d 674, 684.  
120 See id.
121 See id.; Rezulin Prod. Liab. Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 136, 147-48; Burns v. 
Western So. Life Ins. Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 401, 403; Grennell v. Western So.Life Ins. 
Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396 (S.D. W.Va. 2004).
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The following sections consider these various approaches and set forth our views 
on their merits.  We reach three conclusions.  First, we conclude that federal courts 
should continue to recognize and develop the doctrine of procedural misjoinder.  Second, 
we conclude that federal courts should apply Federal Rule 20 (rather than state joinder 
rules) to assess the joinder or misjoinder of the state court parties.  Third, we conclude 
that the “egregiousness” requirement adopted by some courts is unwarranted and should 
be abandonded.  Adding these together, we arrive at our main position – that federal 
courts should disregard parties joined in violation of Federal Rule 20 when determining 
whether complete diversity exists for purposes of removal.
A. Protecting Access to Federal Courts
As a threshold matter, we must consider whether the federal courts should 
recognize the doctrine of procedural misjoinder at all.  The Federal Practice and 
Procedure treatise, for example, questions whether it is necessary, pointing out that the 
defendant could seek severance in state court.  Given that option, perhaps federal courts 
should not do anything to further complicate an already messy jurisdictional area like 
removal.  Moreover, even if procedural misjoinder reflects good jurisdictional policy, one 
might question whether it is authorized.  As discussed in Part II, nothing in the current 
removal statute explicitly states that incomplete diversity removal is allowed if the spoiler 
is misjoined.  Thus, one might simply choose to defer to the plain text and say that 
complete diversity is required – period. These are legitimate objections and must be 
answered.  As explained below, however, we think the better course is that federal courts 
continue to adopt and develop the doctrine of procedural misjoinder subject, of course, to 
any contrary action by Congress.
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First, we are persuaded that misjoinder in fact presents a real problem in diversity 
removal.  The reported cases are not random or isolated.  Rather, they appear in courts 
from across the country and span nearly a decade.  We suspect they reflect a more 
widespread strategy in which some lawyers design their litigation packages around 
keeping the case in state court rather than efficiency or convenience.  Our confidence in
this not-particularly-earth-shattering assertion is bolstered by history.  The doctrine of 
procedural misjoinder may only have been “discovered” in the last 10 years, but lawyers
have been gaming party structure to block removal since at least the post-Civil War era.
Indeed, one is hard-pressed to identify a more enduring problem in removal.
Ironically, recent developments in class action jurisdiction may well exacerbate 
the problem.  Under the recently enacted Class Action Fairness Act, Congress broadly 
expanded diversity jurisdiction over interstate class actions and mass actions.122  Among 
other things, defendants will be able to remove such actions based on minimal diversity 
and without regard to the presence of a local defendant.  While some opportunities still 
exist to structure non-removable state court class actions and mass actions, they are few 
and narrowly-drawn.  One possible result is that plaintiffs will continue to file the same 
types of lawsuits, knowing that they are likely to be removed.  But one also might suspect 
that plaintiffs will file ever more joined-but-not-mass actions in order to escape the Class 
Action Fairness Act.  And of that group, many are sure to deliberately join spoiler parties 
with an eye towards defeating ordinary diversity removal.
Second, and most importantly, we think the procedural misjoinder doctrine is an 
important – and arguably necessary – addition to the law of diversity removal.  
122
 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
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Specifically, we part company with the view that the possibility of seeking severance in 
state court is an adequate substitute.  We do so because, under that approach, state joinder 
practices would define access to federal court.  In our view, tying removal to state joinder 
rules puts the diversity removal docket in jeopardy and fails to protect defendants’ access 
to federal court.
Imagine a state joinder rule that allowed unlimited defendant joinder – i.e., a rule 
that allowed plaintiffs to join completely unrelated defendants.  Under that system, 
further imagine a plaintiff from that state with a product liability claim against a non-
resident drug company.  On its own, complete diversity would exist.  But instead, the 
state plaintiff avails himself of his state’s unlimited joinder law and adds a claim against 
his local plumber for faulty repair of his leaking toilet.  In that case, there would be no 
“misjoinder” as defined by state law and the defendant, being unable to obtain a 
severance in state court, would be locked in state court.
We think that outcome is inconsistent with prevailing removal practice.  It has 
never been supposed that federal courts must defer to state practices in determining 
whether removal is proper.  Under modern removal practice, for example, only 
defendants may remove, and plaintiffs may not.123  On two occasions, the Supreme Court 
has rejected removal on the basis that the parties attempting to remove were plaintiffs, 
even though state practice denominated them as defendants.  As the Supreme Court 
succinctly explained, “[f]or the purpose of removal, the federal law determines who is 
plaintiff and who is defendant.  It is a question of the construction of the federal statute 
12328 U.S.C. §1441(a).  See also FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 
__.
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on removal, and not the state statute.  The latter’s procedural provisions cannot control 
the privilege or removal granted by the federal statute.”124
In these cases, the Supreme Court shows that it understands the real task at hand –
identifying Congress’s intent.  And the Court recognizes that there is no reason to think 
that Congress ever intended to delegate to states the question of “who” can remove.
Indeed, blindly following state practice on who is a defendant would frustrate Congress’s 
intent by making removal practice vary based on which state was involved:  “The 
removal statute which is nationwide in its operation, was intended to be uniform in its 
application, unaffected by local law definition or characterization of the subject matter to 
which it is to be applied.  Hence the Act of Congress must be construed as setting up its 
own criteria, irrespective of local law, for determining in what instances suits are to be 
removed from the state to the federal courts.”125
Within this larger context, it is easy to see why it is an insufficient response to the 
misjoinder problem for federal courts to simply remand defendants to state court with
instructions to seek severance there.  If a defendant’s sole recourse is to seek severance in 
state court, then access to the federal courthouse becomes dependent on the peculiar party 
structure practices of the state courts.  This is inconsistent with the principle, consistently 
articulated by the Supreme Court, that removal is governed by federal standards uniform 
124Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 580 (1954); see also
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941) (“at the outset it is to be 
noted that decision turns on the meaning of the removal statute and not upon the 
characterization of the suit or the parties to it by state statutes or decisions.”).
125Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 104; see also Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405 
U.S. 699, 705 (1972) (“While, of course, Texas is free to establish such rules of practice 
for her own courts as she chooses, the removal statutes and decisions of this Court are 
intended to have uniform nationwide application.”). 
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across the country.  It is no answer to say that, in most cases, state joinder standards and 
Federal Rule 20 would yield the same result.  For one thing, this general overlap provides 
little comfort when states do adopt comparatively broad joinder rules, as did Mississippi 
until very recently.  But more importantly, we do not think the question turns on whether 
state and federal joinder standards differ a little or a lot.  We suspect, for example, that 
state law and federal law would reach identical conclusions in most cases about which 
party is the plaintiff and which is the defendant.  But that has never been supposed as a 
reason for deferring to state party designations.  
We also have serious doubts about whether, under the current removal statutes, it 
would be practicable to require defendants to seek severance in state court.  As the 
removal statutes now stand, a petition to remove a suit based on diversity of citizenship 
must be filed within one year of the time the suit is filed in state court.126 Events that 
make a state court action removable after the one-year deadline are immaterial.127  This 
means that the defendant contesting misjoinder in state court must seek and obtain a 
severance in state court within the first year the suit is filed in order to meet the one-year 
window for diversity removal.  We fear that this will cause trouble for many defendants.  
It is far from certain that the state court judge would even entertain the motion within one 
year.  A clear act of misjoinder could fall victim to a slow docket, an indecisive judge, or 
get lost behind a host of other motions (some perhaps strategically timed to divert the 
state court’s energy and attention for one year).  Moreover, as with any removal topic, it 
is difficult to predict what other complications might arise given the disparate practices 
12628 U.S.C. §1446(b).
127 See FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note __.
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and procedures that one confronts in the state courts across the country.  Without 
attempting to canvass the field, we suspect that some state’s practices would present other 
challenges to the defendant’s ability to obtain a clean break from the misjoined parties.
Finally, we do not read the current removal statutes as foreclosing the doctrine of 
procedural misjoinder.  We concede, of course, that the removal statutes do not explicitly 
authorize it.  And we acknowledge – though perhaps question128 – the general 
proscription that the removal statutes are to be construed narrowly.  But it is too late in 
the day to take a purely strict constructionist approach and insist that only cases that 
satisfy complete diversity at the time of removal can be removed, and nothing else.
In two different circumstances, the Supreme Court has interpreted the removal 
statutes to allow removal of a case that, at the time, does not meet the complete diversity 
requirement.  Under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, the court allows removal of an 
incomplete diversity case when the court is satisfied that it can dispense with the spoiler.  
While we say that the court “disregards” the spoiler, the reality is that the court takes 
jurisdiction over the spoiler and enters a binding order – i.e., one that carries preclusive 
effect – dismissing the claim on the merits.  The Supreme Court’s recognition of the 
jurisdictional cure doctrine in removed cases is another example.  Indeed, in that 
situation, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that it needed to find exceptions 
for both the diversity statute and the removal statute, respectively.  Both of these 
exceptions to the complete diversity requirement exist because they are deemed to 
promote federal norms about when the federal courthouse door should be open.  If 
128
 See, e.g., Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 609 (2004).
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procedural misjoinder also promotes those norms, then there is no reason why it should 
be singled out under a strict construction theory of removal.
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that there is history here.  Congress 
allowed “separable controversy” removal for a period and then abandoned it.129  In this
respect, the absence of any current mechanism in the removal framework carries more 
significance.130  But we do not think that Congress’s earlier abandonment of separable 
controversy removal forecloses the courts from recognizing the procedural misjoinder 
doctrine today.
First, the old “separable controversy” mechanism and modern procedural 
misjoinder really are different mechanisms.131  Separable controversy removal did not 
turn on transactional relatedness.  Rather, it turned solely on whether the plaintiff pleaded 
joint or several liability.  If the plaintiff pleaded claims against co-defendants and 
asserted several liability, the controversy was separable even though the claims arose 
from the same transaction. Thus, many related parties would have been subject to 
separable controversy removal.  
Moreover, what Congress jettisoned was a rule that allowed the entire suit to be 
removed to federal court if it contained a separable component.132 The procedural 
129
 See supra notes _____ and accompanying text.
130
 See, e.g., Shamrock Oil comment re former statutes allowing plaintiff removal.
131
 Congress also abandoned separate claim removal in diversity suits.  That was 
truly a foreign concept and says little about the vitality of procedural misjoinder.
132
 The original separable controversy provision contemplated that only the 
diverse part of the separable controversy would be removed.  See supra notes ___ and 
accompanying text.  As a result, related suits were sometimes split between state and 
federal court, an inefficiency that led Congress to amend the statute to bring the entirety 
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misjoinder doctrine does not contemplate shifting the entire suit to federal court for 
disposition of the merits.  Rather, it contemplates a brief shift of the suit to federal court 
only for so long as it takes for the federal judge to identify the misjoinder and sever.  It 
specifically contemplates that, after severance, any claims that then fail the complete 
diversity test will be remanded.
Finally, it is important to note that fraudulent joinder – a doctrine first developed 
to implement separable controversy removal – survived the abrogation of separable 
controversy removal.  Indeed, if anything, the doctrine of fraudulent joinder has grown 
since the adoption of transactional pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.    
In short, while there is history here, we do not think it can be fairly read to preclude the 
limited procedural misjoinder that we advocate.  Rather, we are quite comfortable that the 
existing diversity removal framework – whether viewed through the lens of history or 
modern practice – can accommodate procedural misjoinder.
B. Federal Joinder Standards
Having established that federal courts should recognize procedural misjoinder, we 
now turn to a question that has occupied a great deal of attention among the lower courts 
-- whether the joinder at issue should be judged by state or federal joinder standards.  
When the Eleventh Circuit started all of this in Tapscott in 1996, it applied Federal Rule 
of the “separable controversy” to federal court.  The procedural misjoinder doctrine, 
however, does not risk splitting related suits between state and federal court.  If the 
claims are related, they will satisfy the low threshold for joinder under Federal Rule 20 
and no misjoinder will exist for the court to sever.  Only when unrelated claims have 
been joined will the doctrine of procedural misjoinder carve the suit into a state 
component and a federal component.
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20 without discussion.133  The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Moore which tacitly endorsed the 
procedural misjoinder doctrine said even less.134  Perhaps those courts thought it did not 
matter.  In many cases, the state and federal standards will be sufficiently alike – if not 
identical – that the result will be the same under either.135  But in other cases the state and 
federal joinder standards will differ considerably.136  Thus, the district courts have had 
many occasions to address this important question.
133Tapscott v. MS Dealer Svc. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996).
134In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 309 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 2002).
135See, e.g., Asher v. 3M Co., 2005 WL 1593941, at *7 (E.D. Ky. June 30, 2005) 
(“Here, the Court need not decide whether federal or state joinder rules apply . . . because 
the Kentucky and federal rules regarding joinder are, in all practical respects, identical.”); 
Reed v. Am. Med. Security Group, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 798, 804 (S.D. Miss. 2004) 
(stating that, under Mississippi’s new joinder rule, “the difference between applying 
federal and state standards for joinder could fairly be said, at least for purposes of this 
case, to be more theoretical than practical”); Grennell v. Western So. Life Ins. Co., 298 F. 
Supp. 2d 390, 397 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (“[T]his court need not decide whether to apply 
federal or state law regarding permissive joinder, as the two are identical in West 
Virginia.”); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 667, 673 (E.D. Pa. 2003 
(federal and Georgia state joiner standards were “virtually identical”); Conk v. Richards 
& O’Neill, LLP, 77 F. Supp. 2d 956, 971 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (“the difference between 
applying federal and state standards for joinder may be more theoretical than practical in 
this case”).
136See, e.g., Osborn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 
2004) (noting that joinder would be improper under Federal Rule 20 but proper under 
California’s more liberal joinder practice). Until 2004, the difference was particularly 
acute in Mississippi.  Before then, it was generally held that Mississippi state practice 
allowed “virtually unlimited” party joinder, largely to offset the fact that Mississippi does 
not have a class action mechanism.  See Jamison v. Purdue Pharma Co., 251 F. Supp. 2d 
1315, 1320 (S.D. Miss. 2003).  In 2004, an amendment to Mississippi’s version of Rule 
20 and a pathbreaking decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court converged to bring 
Mississippi joinder practice more in line with federal joinder practice, at least in personal 
injury cases.  See Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866 So. 2d 1092, 1097 (Miss. 
2004).  It would be premature, however, to say that Mississippi and federal joinder 
practice are now identical.  Moreover, it is not yet clear whether these reforms also reach 
joinder in low-damage consumer fraud cases.  Walton v. Tower Loan of Miss., 338 F. 
Supp. 2d 691, 695-96 & n.5 (N.D. Miss. 2004).
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One early district court opinion invoked the Erie doctrine on its way to holding 
that Federal Rule 20 would control a procedural question such as this in federal court.137
In Coleman v. Conseco, Inc., the court concluded that, because “the joinder provisions of 
[Federal] Rule 20 are procedural in nature,” Federal Rule 20 must be followed as a valid 
exercise of the Rules Enabling Act process.138  This is no doubt true as a general 
proposition, but it answers the wrong question.  The question is not whether federal 
joinder standards apply in federal court diversity suits, but, rather, whether the case may 
be removed to federal court consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  Nothing in Hanna v. 
Plumer, the Rules Enabling Act, or any other component of the Erie doctrine requires 
that Congress look exclusively to Federal Rule 20 in deciding which claims or parties 
count towards the complete diversity requirement.
Not surprisingly, Coleman and its Erie rationale appear to have been abandoned.
A few other district courts have applied Federal Rule 20, but not for Erie reasons.  
Rather, they have done so either because they were following Tapscott or without 
discussion. 139  Rather, the district courts have universally rejected Coleman’s reasoning 
and instead have assessed joinder under state law.140  Indeed, the victory has been so 
137Coleman v. Conseco, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 804, 815-16 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
138238 F. Supp. 2d at 816.
139 See In re Silican Prods. Liab. Litig., 2005 WL 1593936, at *74 n. 141 (S.D. 
Tex. June 30, 2005) (following Tapscott); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 168 F. Supp. 
2d 136, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (no discussion).
140See Conk v. Richards & O’Neill, LLP., 77 F. Supp. 2d 956, 971 (S.D. Ind. 
1999); see also Jackson v. Truly, 307 F. Supp. 2d 818, 824 (N.D. Miss. 2004); In re Diet 
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 667, 673 (E.D. Pa. 2003); In re
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complete that even the author of Coleman – the case that had invoked Erie to select 
Federal Rule 20 – switched sides.141
The courts that follow state joinder rules do so for two principal reasons.  First, 
they often analogize to fraudulent joinder. Because courts look to state law to determine 
whether a party was fraudulently joined, they reason that they should also look to state 
law to determine if a party has been misjoined.142  One court put it this way: “Federal 
law does not govern whether a plaintiff has stated a viable claim against a non-diverse 
defendant for purposes of fraudulent joinder.  Similarly, we do not see how federal 
joinder rules should apply when the issue is fraudulent misjoinder of non-diverse 
plaintiffs in a state court action so as to defeat our diversity jurisdiction.”143
Second, the courts that follow state joinder law argue that misjoinder must refer to 
state joinder rules because “the question is whether the parties were misjoined in state 
court.”144  As one court explained, “[a]fter all, when [the plaintiff] filed his complaint in 
[state] court, he was not required to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
terms of joinder of parties or claims or any other aspect of the case.”145 Following this 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 722, 729 (S.D. Ind. 2003); Jamison v. 
Purdue Pharma Co., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1321 n.6 (S.D. Miss. 2003).
141Sweeney v. Sherwin Williams Co., 304 F. Supp. 2d 868, 875 (S.D. Miss. 2004) 
(abrogating Coleman).
142Jackson v. Truly, 307 F. Supp. 2d 818, 824 (N.D. Miss. 2004); Jamison v. 
Purdue Pharma Co., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1321 n.6 (S.D. Miss. 2003).
143In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 667, 673-74 (E.D. Pa. 
2003); see also Conk v. Richards & O’Neill, LLP, 77 F. Supp. 2d 956, 971 (S.D. Ind. 
1999).
144Osborn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
145Conk v. Richards & O’Neill, LLP, 77 F. Supp. 2d 956, 971 (S.D. Ind. 1999). 
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line of reasoning, one court added that “[i]t makes little sense to say that the [non-diverse 
party’s] joinder became fraudulent only after removal and only under the federal rule.”146
Though these arguments have a superficial appeal, closer scrutiny shows them to 
be flawed. First, the analogy to fraudulent joinder is misleading.  Distilled to its essence, 
the fraudulent joinder doctrine states that courts should disregard bogus claims against 
non-diverse defendants when assessing whether diversity is complete.  Thus, substantive 
merit becomes a jurisdictional filter, and the courts look to state law to define merit.  But 
what is the alternative?  In a diversity suit, the substantive merits are set by state law.  
When the federal courts use substantive merit as a gatekeeper for diversity jurisdiction, 
they have no choice but to use state law to define merit.
While procedural misjoinder acts as another jurisdictional gatekeeper, it does not 
use substantive merit to control the gate.  Under the procedural misjoinder doctrine,
courts disregard unrelated claims against non-diverse parties when assessing whether 
diversity is complete.  Whether the claims are weak or strong is irrelevant.  All that 
matters is whether the claims are sufficiently related (or unrelated).  
The argument that only state joinder rules can define whether a case is 
“misjoined” while pending in state court simply misunderstands the role of procedural 
misjoinder.  The doctrine of procedural misjoinder does not exist to police state joinder 
rules.  It exists to safeguard fair access to the federal courts.  What is important is not 
146Jamison v. Purdue Pharma Co., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1321 n.6 (S.D. Miss. 
2003) (emphasis in original); see also Asher v. 3M Co., 2005 WL 1593941, at *7 n.3 
(E.D. Ky. 2005) (“If the plaintiffs’ claims were properly joined under state rules, then 
there was no basis for removing the action to federal court in the first place because there 
was no diversity jurisdiction.”).
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whether state joinder rules are being properly followed, but whether the joinder of parties 
in state court is unfairly restricting access to the federal courts.  It must be remembered 
that “procedural misjoinder” is just the term the courts chose to describe situations where 
they will overlook the presence of a diversity spoiler whose connection to an otherwise 
removable lawsuit is too tenuous.  The courts could just as easily have embraced the 
phrase “diversity spoiling.”  It would still do no more than convey the court’s conclusion 
that removal is proper despite the party structure chosen by the plaintiff in state court.
Which brings us back to the core point.  Procedural misjoinder may pivot on the 
relatedness of claims by or against joined parties, but it is ultimately a jurisdictional 
doctrine.  It reflects a policy choice that sometimes defendants should be able to remove 
even though there are spoiler parties included in the state court suit.  The standards for 
when we allow removal under these circumstances reflect federal policy about when the 
federal courts should be available to defendants originally sued in state court.  We could 
look anywhere to find relatedness standards to give mechanical content to this removal 
mechanism.  To the extent either federal joinder standards or state joinder standards 
supply that content, it is because they best serve federal policy.
As a policy matter, we think federal joinder is the right match.  In truth, we think 
it is the only match.  State joinder rules cannot do the job.  To realize this, one need only 
recall that even properly applied state joinder standards can thwart federal diversity 
policy if they allow unrelated or loosely-related claims to be joined in one action.147 If 
you believe – as we do – that there is a value to giving out-of-state defendants access to 
federal court when sued by a home state plaintiff, and if you believe – as we do – that the 
147See supra notes ____ and accompanying text.
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presence of a wholly unrelated non-diverse party should not foreclose that access to 
federal court, then you cannot blindly defer to whatever joinder rules the states might 
decide to follow, however permissive.
In contrast, there are many advantages to using Federal Rule 20 to define 
relatedness.  Federal courts make Rule 20 joinder decisions routinely in cases invoking 
original jurisdiction, and are thus far more familiar with its requirements and scope than 
they would be with state joinder rules.  Using Federal Rule 20 to define relatedness 
would yield a nationally uniform standard for disregarding “unrelated” state court parties, 
whereas using state joinder law would make federal jurisdiction different in districts 
located in states with strict joinder rules than those located in states with liberal joinder 
rules.  Using Federal Rule 20 to define relatedness would also result in greater equality 
among parties with regard to access to a federal forum.  If a particular party alignment 
would have been improper if filed in federal court, but proper if access to federal court is 
sought by a defendant through removal, defendants may be unfairly disadvantaged in 
asserting federal court protection.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has not explicitly weighed in on this 
subject, there is some evidence that the Court does not think that federal removal should 
incorporate state joinder practices.  In Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corporation, 
the United States was made party to a lawsuit when the original defendant filed a 
counter-claim and joined the United States as a co-defendant.148 The United States 
148
 405 U.S. 699, 700-01 (1972).  In truth, the counter-claim plaintiff was not 
asserting any claim for relief against the United States, but instead added the United 
States as a party because the United States had a pre-existing judgment against the 
counter-claim plaintiff and wanted the state court to sort out priorities among the 
potential creditors.  Id. at 701.
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removed the entire case, including the claims asserted between the original plaintiff and 
defendant, and including claims brought by the counter-claim plaintiff involving other 
potential creditors, some of whom were not diverse.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court 
upheld removal jurisdiction despite the presence of the satellite non-diverse parties, 
stating that “[i]t would serve no purpose to require that in order to sustain jurisdiction in 
such a case, the prevailing party in the original two-sided litigation must go further and 
show that there was likewise jurisdiction as to virtually unrelated claims that the state 
court had permitted to be joined in the same lawsuit.”149 The Supreme Court’s reasoning 
for this holding is telling:  “While, of course, Texas is free to establish such rules of
practice for her own courts as she chooses, the removal statutes and decisions of this 
Court are intended to have uniform nationwide application.  ‘Hence the Act of Congress 
must be construed as setting up its own criteria, irrespective of local law, for determining 
in what instances suits are to be removed from the state to the federal courts.’”150
As a cautionary note, we appreciate that procedural misjoinder foists a 
jurisdictional gatekeeping role onto a federal joinder rule never designed to serve such a 
function.  As discussed in Part II, supra, Rule 20 was deliberately crafted to sweep 
broadly, allowing all related parties and claims to be brought together in a single case.151
But Rule 20 does not play the role of bouncer because it does not have to; other federal 
149Id., at 705-06.
150Id. at 705 (quoting Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941)).
151
 As the Supreme Court has explained, “Under the Rules, the impulse is toward 
entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; 
joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.” United Mine Workers of 
Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
57
rules stand ready to usher out parties who outlast their welcome.  Indeed, federal courts 
enjoy wide discretion to carve up the litigation into more efficient and fair packages, 
trying separate issues and claims under Rule 42(b) and dropping or adding parties under 
Rule 21.  It is these rules that truly determine the scope of a federal lawsuit, granting 
district courts the authority to conduct fair and efficient adjudication of claims.152  So 
when a case brought in federal court stretches the bounds of Rule 20’s same transaction 
test, the court may address any prejudice or loss of efficiency by severing parties or 
claims as needed rather than denying joinder in the first place.153
Given the limited role of Rule 20, therefore, federal courts must appreciate that 
the procedural misjoinder doctrine we advocate will not be a panacea.  The broad sweep 
of Rule 20 will continue to give plaintiffs wide latitude in determining party structure.  
And in many of these cases, it will no doubt appear that the plaintiffs have taken 
advantage of Rule 20’s lenient approach to joinder to construct a non-removable case.  
But we trust that federal court s will resist any temptation to alter the meaning of Rule 20 
out of a desire to clamp down on such perceived plaintiff joinder abuses.  The focus of 
152
 In light of the fact that any decision to allow joinder of tangentially related 
claims of multiple parties may be dealt with at a later stage of the litigation through Rules 
42(b) or 21, courts may be tempted to take a no harm, no foul approach to sketchy joinder 
claims.
153 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 11C Music, 202 F.R.D. 229 (M.D. Tenn. 
2001) (noting that even if it had not found the joinder of parties improper, “the Court 
would exercise the discretion afforded it to order a severance”); Rappoport v. Steven 
Spielberg, Inc.,16  F. Supp.481 (D. N.J. 1998) (quoting Wyndam Assoc. v. Bintliff, 398 
F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir. 1968 ) (holding that Rule 21 “authorizes the severance of any 
claim, even without a finding of improper joinder, where there are sufficient other 
reasons for ordering a severance”).
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Rule 20 must continue to be driven by its direct role in regulating joinder, not by the 
indirect role it will play in regulating removal jurisdiction.    
Reliance on a joinder rule ill-equipped to perform a jurisdictional gatekeeping 
function, therefore, is admittedly far from a perfect solution to the procedural misjoinder 
problem.  We believe it is nevertheless preferable to the even more problematic 
alternatives of applying state joinder rules or abandoning any attempt to police joinder 
gamesmanship altogether.   
C. Rejection of the Egregiousness Test
Finally, assuming the vitality of the procedural misjoinder doctrine, we must 
address the question of whether to restrict its application to cases involving “egregious” 
or bad faith misjoinder.  In our view, such an egregiousness test makes little sense in the 
context of procedural misjoinder.  The origin of this test can be found in Tapscott, which 
considered procedural misjoinder to be a species of fraudulent joinder.154  Because the 
court believed that the doctrine of fraudulent joinder required some finding of 
egregiousness or fraud on the part of the plaintiff, it imported that concept into its 
application of procedural misjoinder.  This approach is flawed in several respects.
First, procedural misjoinder is best understood not as a type of fraudulent joinder, 
but rather as an independent exception to the requirement of complete diversity at the 
time of removal.  In other words, both doctrines authorize courts to disregard the 
presence of certain nondiverse parties.  With respect to fraudulent joinder, that means 
excluding from the complete diversity calculus any nondiverse party against whom a 
154 See, e.g., Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(finding the misjoinder of parties to be “so egregious as to constitute fraudulent joinder”).
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frivolous claim has been asserted.  In cases involving procedural misjoinder, however, 
courts ignore the presence of improperly joined nondiverse parties.  The viability of the 
claim by or against a nondiverse party is utterly irrelevant in the context of procedural 
misjoinder, which focuses solely on the relatedness of the claims plaintiffs seek to join.
Second the “fraudulent” nature of fraudulent joinder itself increasingly has been 
called into question.  As one court explained, fraudulent joinder is simply a “term of art 
‘which does not impugn the integrity of plaintiffs or their counsel and does not refer to an 
intent to deceive.’”155  Similarly, if a plaintiff misjoins a nondiverse party, there need be 
no inference of fraud or bad intent.  Rather, the remedy for such an error should 
be simply to disregard the misjoined party in determining complete diversity.  Indeed, 
even if the plaintiff did deliberately attempt to prevent removal to federal court by adding 
the claims of nondiverse parties, there is nothing inherently fraudulent about such a 
motive.  Plaintiffs are free to bring suit in the forum of their choice, structuring their 
actions and joining claims and parties as they wish, so long as the resulting lawsuit 
comports with the applicable joinder rules and asserts nonfrivolous claims.
This analysis reveals the inaptness of terms like “fraudulent misjoinder” or the 
requirement of an egregiousness element.  The purpose of procedural misjoinder is not to 
search the hearts of plaintiffs to uncover their motives for adding non-diverse parties.156
155 Greene, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
156
 Indeed, application of an egregiousness test would impose an unnecessarily 
burdensome and subjective inquiry into the plaintiffs’ state of mind, a problematic 
exercise at best.  How should a court draw the line between egregious and non-egregious 
misjoinder of nondiverse parties?  Can that line be drawn solely from the face of the 
pleadings, or will courts need to delve more deeply into plaintiffs’ psyches?  See, e.g., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note __, § 3723 (criticizing procedural 
misjoinder doctrine in part because of the increased complexity implicit in Tapscott’s
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Rather, procedural misjoinder doctrine reflects an important limitation on the outer 
reaches of plaintiff autonomy in cases where the joinder of nondiverse parties denies 
defendants the ability to seek the federal forum to which they are entitled.  If those limits
are not observed, removal is thwarted whether the joinder was improper by a little or by a 
lot.  The focus, therefore, must be on the protection of defendants’ right of access to 
federal courts and the proper joinder structure of a lawsuit, not on the motives or bad 
faith of plaintiffs, and the doctrine should not limited to the worst offenders.
CONCLUSION
The tension between party joinder and removal of diversity cases has vexed both 
Congress and the courts for well over a century.  We think the doctrine of procedural 
misjoinder provides federal judges much-needed authority to disregard improperly joined 
non-diverse parties whose presence would otherwise block access to federal court.  
States, of course, are free to make their own choices about what constitutes an 
appropriate litigation package in state court.  But access to federal court should not turn
on those state policy choices.  Rather, defendants faced with diversity-destroying but 
transactionally-unrelated parties should have access to a federal remedy guided by federal 
standards defining the proper scope of a multi-party lawsuit.  Such a remedy, of course, 
cannot relieve all of the tension between our loose joinder standards and our 
comparatively strict jurisdictional requirements.  But by eliminating the strategic benefit 
to adding in unrelated or barely-related parties, it would cut down the incentive structure 
that is currently driving misjoinder.
contention that “not all procedural misjoinder rises to the level of fraudulent joinder”); 
Burns, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 403.  
